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Abstract
First-order theories are ordered under logical entailment based on the amount of information de-
rived from theories. In default logic, on the other hand, a theory contains default information as well
as deﬁnite information. To order default theories, distinguishing different sorts of information is nec-
essary to assess the information content of a default theory. For this purpose, we ﬁrst introduce a
multi-valued interpretation of default theories using a ten-valued bilattice. It distinguishes between
deﬁnite and credulous/skeptical default information derived from a theory, and is used for ordering
default theories based on their information contents. We then apply the technique to order nonmono-
tonic logic programs under the answer set semantics. The results of this paper provide a method for
comparing default theories or nonmonotonic logic programs in a manner different from the conven-
tional extension/model-based viewpoint.Moreover, they have important application to induction from
nonmonotonic theories.
© 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In knowledge representation based on logic, different theories are compared by the
amount of information derived from them. In ﬁrst-order logic, a theory T1 has more
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information than another theory T2 if T1 has fewer models than T2 [18]. The relation is
represented using logical entailment as T1T2 and T2 / T1, i.e., every formula derived
from T2 is also derived from T1 but not vice versa. In this case, a theory T1 is said stronger
than T2. For instance, the theory
T1 : bird, bird → ﬂies
is stronger than the theory
T2 : bird ∨ ﬂies.
Here, T1 derives bird and ﬂies that are not derived from T2, so that T1 is considered more
informative than T2. First-order theories are thus compared and ordered under logical en-
tailment.
Our primary interest in this paper is the corresponding problem in default logic [20]. A
default theory  contains default rules as well as ﬁrst-order formulas. Considering compar-
ison of different default theories, the problem is not so simple. For instance, consider the
default theory:
T3 : bird, bird : ﬂiesﬂies .
Viewing T1 as a default theory with no default rule, two default theories T1 and T3 have
the same extension T h({ bird, ﬂies }). If we compare two theories in terms of formulas
derived from each theory, no difference exists between them. Carefully observing each
theory, however, the fact ﬂies from T1 is a conclusion derived from ﬁrst-order formulas,
while the same fact from T3 is a conclusion derived using a default rule. The former is a
deﬁnite conclusion which is persistent as far as information in the theory is effective, while
the latter is a default conclusion possibly withdrawn in face of additional information to the
theory. The conclusion ﬂies from T1 is thereby considered stronger than the same conclusion
from T2.
On the other hand, default conclusions are not uniform in default theories. Consider two
default theories:
T4 : : innocentinnocent ,
T5 : : ¬guiltyinnocent ,
: ¬innocent
guilty
,
where T4 has the single extension T h({innocent}), and T5 has two extensions
T h({innocent}) and T h({guilty}). Then, innocent is a skeptical default conclusion of T4,
while it is a credulous default conclusion of T5. In this case, T4 is considered stronger than
T5 in the sense that T4 has no ambiguity in its conclusion.
From these examples, we can see that a default theory contains different sorts of in-
formation in general. Information entailed by the classical portion of a default theory is
persistent, while those entailed by the default portion are tentative. On the other hand,
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default information that belongs to every extension has strong support to believe, but those
belong to some (but not every) extensions are weak. This is a unique feature of default logic
which is in contrast to the case of ﬁrst-order logic where every formula is uniform and has
equal position. Those different sorts of information are to be distinguished to compare and
order default theories. Such consideration is meaningful and important with the following
reasons.
• Distinguishing different sorts of information
Studies in nonmonotonic logics have been centered on answering the question: “What
information is concluded from a theory (with common-sense)?” On the other hand, few
studies answer the question: “What sort of information is concluded from a theory?” Since
default theories contain deﬁnite and skeptical/credulous default information, distinguishing
different sorts of information ismeaningful to assess the information content of a theory. De-
fault theories contain incomplete information, so that the assessment provides a theoretical
ground to measure the degree of “incompleteness” of a theory. Distinction between deﬁnite
and default consequences derived from a default theory has originally been considered by
Ginsberg [13]. He addresses the merit of such distinction as:
“it should be necessary merely to record the fact that the conclusion never achieved
more than default status. ... The default value explicitly admits to the possibility of
new information overturning the tentative conclusion it represents”.
Such “bookkeeping” mechanism is useful to know “how true or false a given statement
is believed to be?” or “how much or little is known about it?” [13]. However, as will be
discussed in Section 4.2, Ginsberg does not distinguish skeptical and credulous default
consequences derived from a theory.
In a different context, Russell and Norvig [21, p. 360] argue that
“how can beliefs that have default status be used to make decisions? This is prob-
ably the hardest issue for default reasoning. Decisions often involve trade-offs, and
one therefore needs to compare the strength of belief in the outcomes of different
actions”.
In this respect, distinguishing different sorts of information would help to compare the
strength of belief in the outcomes of different default theories.
• Comparison of different default theories
Comparison of theories is intended to know the relative value between them. A theory
is considered more valuable than another theory if the former contains more information
than the latter. This is because a more informative theory has a greater possibility of solv-
ing a problem than a less informative one. Comparison of theories is especially important
when there exist multiple sources of information as in multi-agent systems. Under the
circumstance, an agent having more information could take precedence in problem solv-
ing. In ﬁrst-order logic, a stronger theory is more informative, and theories are ordered
by logical entailment. In default logic, however, extensions of theories are not necessarily
helpful for judging relative strength between theories as seen in the introductory exam-
ple. Then, how one can say a theory is stronger than another theory in the context of
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default logic? To know the relation, it is necessary to provide a better ability of comparing
default theories beyond their extensions. We consider that a default theory is stronger if it
brings “more certain” information. In other words, if a default theory 1 is stronger than
another theory 2, we have more reason to believe in consequences from 1 than those
from 2.
• Application to logic programming
Default theories have close connection to nonmonotonic logic programs. Nonmonotonic
logic programs extend classical Horn logic programs by the introduction of negation as
failure, and provide a powerful tool for representing and reasoning with incomplete in-
formation [3,7]. As nonmonotonic logic programs are considered a subclass of default
theories, techniques of ordering default theories are directly applied to the problem of
ordering logic programs. Ordering logic programs has an important application. In ﬁrst-
order logic, a theory is called more general than another theory if the former is stronger
than the latter. Generality relations over ﬁrst-order clauses have been extensively studied
in the ﬁelds of machine learning and inductive logic programming (ILP) [19]. In these
ﬁelds, generalization is used as a basic operation for inductive learning. Induction problems
assume a background theory which is incomplete, otherwise there is no need to learn. How-
ever, the present ILP systems mostly handle Horn logic programs as background theories,
which are less expressive for representing and reasoning with incomplete knowledge. This
leads to the need of constructing a theory of nonmonotonic inductive logic programming
(NMILP) [22]. Like ILP an induction task in NMILP is to ﬁnd a new program which gen-
eralizes a background theory to account for given examples. In contrast to the classical
ILP, a background theory and an induced program are possibly nonmonotonic theories.
To construct induction systems that learn nonmonotonic theories, it is necessary to ex-
tend the generalization operation and to build a theory for ordering nonmonotonic theories.
Ordering default theories and nonmonotonic logic programs thus has potential applica-
tion to the theory of induction in nonmonotonic logics and nonmonotonic inductive logic
programming.
With these background and motivation, this paper studies methods for ordering default
theories and nonmonotonic logic programs. To this end, we ﬁrst provide a multi-valued
interpretation for default theories based on a ten-valued bilattice. It can distinguish differ-
ent sorts of information derived from default theories. We then introduce an order rela-
tion over default theories, which orders different default theories based on multi-valued
interpretations of formulas. Next, we apply the technique to nonmonotonic logic pro-
gramming, and order extended logic programs under the answer set semantics. The order-
equivalence relation is also introduced as a relation which presents equivalence between
theories based on their information contents. Finally, we discuss an application to inductive
logic programming.
This is a revised and extended version of the paper [23]. The rest of this paper is or-
ganized as follows. Section 2 develops a theory of ordering default theories. Section 3
applies the technique to ordering nonmonotonic logic programs. Section 4 discusses re-
lated issues and applications to inductive logic programming. Section 5 summarizes the
paper.
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2. Ordering default theories
2.1. Default logic
We ﬁrst review the framework of default logic [20]. A default theory is deﬁned as a pair
 = (D,W) where D is a set of default rules and W is a set of quantiﬁer-free formulas
(called facts). A default rule (or simply default) is of the form:
 : 1, . . . ,n

,
where ,1, . . . ,n and  are quantiﬁer-free formulas and, respectively, called the prereq-
uisite, the justiﬁcations and the consequent. In this paper, any default is assumed to have
at least one justiﬁcation (n1). A default theory is called super-normal if every default is
of the form : /. As defaults and facts are syntactically distinguishable, we often write a
default theory as a setW ∪D as far as no confusion arises.Any default/fact with variables
represents the set of its ground instances over the Herbrand universe of . Throughout this
paper we assume a default theory which is already ground-instantiated, i.e., for any default
theory (D,W), D and W contain no variable. Also, a formula means a propositional for-
mula unless stated otherwise. We writeWF if a formula F is a logical consequence ofW.
W1W2 means that every formula which is a logical consequence of W2 is also a logical
consequence ofW1. We writeW1 ≡ W2 iffW1W2 andW2W1.
A set S of formulas is deductively closed if S = T h(S) where Th is the deductive closure
operator as usual. A set E of formulas is an extension of (D,W) if it coincides with the
smallest deductively closed setE′ of formulas satisfying the conditions: (i)W ⊆ E′, and (ii)
for any ground default  : 1, . . . ,n/ fromD,  ∈ E′ and¬i ∈ E (i = 1, . . . , n) imply
 ∈ E′. A default theory may have none, one or multiple extensions in general. The set of
all extensions of is written as EXT (). Given a default theory, a formula is a credulous
conclusion of  if it belongs to some (but not all) extensions. By contrast, a formula is a
skeptical conclusion of  if it belongs to all extensions. 1 An extension E is inconsistent if
it is the set of all formulas in the language. If a default theory has an inconsistent extension,
then this is its only extension.
Proposition 2.1 (Reiter [20, Corollary 2.2]). 2 A default theory  = (D,W) has the in-
consistent extension iff W is inconsistent.
2.2. Multi-valued interpretation of default theories
In classical logic, any formula derived from a theory is a deﬁnite consequence of the
theory. In default logic, on the other hand, a formula derived from a theory is either a
deﬁnite consequence byW or a default consequence byD. Moreover, default consequences
are brought by two different modes of inferences—skeptical or credulous reasoning. To
1 In the usual deﬁnition, a formula is a credulous conclusion if it belongs to some (possibly every) extension.
But in this paper we abuse the term “credulous” to denote non-skeptical conclusions.
2 This property holds for defaults with non-empty justiﬁcations.
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Fig. 1. Bilattice for logic X.
characterize these different types of consequences, we ﬁrst introduce a multi-valued logic
for default reasoning.
Deﬁnition 2.1. The logic X has the ten truth values with the meaning as follows—t: true, f :
false,: contradictory, d: contradictory by default,⊥: undeﬁned, dts: skeptically true by
default, dfs: skeptically false by default, dtc: credulously true by default, dfc: credulously
false by default, and ∗: undetermined by default.
The truth values ofX constitute a bilattice under the knowledge ordering k and the truth
ordering  t (Fig. 1). 3 Here, it holds that⊥k{dtc,dfc}k∗k{dts,dfs}kdk{t, f}
k; f t {,d} t t; dfs td tdts; and f tdfs tdfc t { ∗,⊥} tdtc tdts
 t t. 4
The values t, f , are used for the interpretations of deﬁnite consequences byW, while the
values dts, dfs, d, dtc, dfc, ∗ are used for the interpretations of default consequences byD.
⊥ represents that no information is available. The knowledge ordering reﬂects the certainty
of information content, i.e., ﬁrst-order logical consequences are more certain than skeptical
default consequences, which in turn are more certain than credulous default consequences.
By contrast, the truth ordering represents the degree of truth, for instance, “true” has a
higher degree of truth than “skeptically true by default”, which has a higher degree of truth
than “credulously true by default”, and so on.
In the logic X, negation ¬ is deﬁned as: ¬ = , ¬t = f , ¬f = t, ¬dts = dfs,
¬dfs = dts, ¬dtc = dfc, ¬dfc = dtc, ¬d = d, ¬∗ = ∗, ¬⊥ = ⊥, and ¬¬x = x for
3 In [23], we used a nine-valued logic and a bilattice which do not have the value d.
4 x k{y, z}means x ky and x kz; and {x, y} kzmeans x kz and y kz. The same abbreviation is used
for  t .
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any x ∈ X. On the other hand, the disjunction ∨ and the conjunction ∧ are, respectively,
deﬁned by the join operation and the meet operation with respect to the truth ordering in
the bilattice. That is, t ∨ x = t for x ∈ X, ∗ ∨⊥ = dtc,∧ dfc = f , and so on. It is easily
veriﬁed that ∨ and ∧ are associative, commutative, idempotent and absorptive. 5 Note that
the truth-functional operations ∨ and ∧ have their meaning supplied by the  t ordering,
while we later order default theories by the k ordering. 6
Under the logic X the interpretation of a formula in a default theory is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 2.2. Given a default theory  = (D,W), the mapping  associates a propo-
sitional formula F with a truth value of X as follows:
If EXT () = ∅, (F ) = d for any formula F; Otherwise,
(F ) =


 if WF ∧ ¬F ;
t if WF and W / ¬F ;
f if W / F and W¬F ;
dts if W / F, W / ¬F, and ∀E ∈ EXT () F ∈ E;
dfs if W / F, W / ¬F, and ∀E ∈ EXT () ¬F ∈ E;
dtc if ∃E ∈ EXT () s.t. F ∈ E,
∃E′ ∈ EXT () s.t. F ∈ E′,
and ∀E′′ ∈ EXT () ¬F ∈ E′′;
dfc if ∃E ∈ EXT () s.t. ¬F ∈ E,
∃E′ ∈ EXT () s.t. ¬F ∈ E′,
and ∀E′′ ∈ EXT () F ∈ E′′;
∗ if ∃E ∈ EXT () s.t. F ∈ E,
∃E′ ∈ EXT () s.t. ¬F ∈ E′,
and ∀E′′ ∈ EXT () F ∧ ¬F ∈ E′′;
⊥ if ∀E ∈ EXT () F ∈ E and ¬F ∈ E.
The mapping  provides multi-valued interpretations of formulas in a default theory.
Intuitively, (F ) ∈ {t, f} means that F or ¬F is a deﬁnite conclusion from W. When
(F ) =  for some formulaF,(G) =  for any formulaG. This is because in this case
W is inconsistent and entails every formula. 7 On the other hand, when (F ) ∈ {dts,dfs}
(resp., (F ) ∈ {dtc,dfc}), F or ¬F is a default conclusion inferred skeptically (resp.,
credulously) from . When (F ) = ∗, a formula F belongs to some extension and its
negation¬F belongs to another extension. In this case, the truth value of F is undetermined
by default. Remark that a formula F ∧ ¬F is included in an extension E of  iff W is
inconsistent (Proposition 2.1).  maps a formula F into ⊥ when EXT () = ∅ and F is
included in no extension.
5 They are not distributive, e.g., ∗ ∨ ( ∧⊥) = (∗ ∨ ) ∧ (∗ ∨ ⊥).
6 The join operation and the meet operation with respect to the knowledge ordering are deﬁned as in [11,13].
But those operations are not used for ordering theories, so we do not introduce them in this paper.
7 In this sense, our logic is not “paraconsistent” (cf. Section 4.2).
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With this mapping, the unique truth value from X is assigned to every formula in any
default theory. Thus, every default theory obtains the single meaning even when it has no
extension or multiple extensions.
Example 2.1. Let  be the theory:
bird,
bird : ﬂies
ﬂies ,
which has the single extension T h({ bird, ﬂies }). Then(bird) = t,(ﬂies) = dts, and
(bird → ﬂies) = dts, etc.
Example 2.2. Let  be the theory:
: ¬rh-broken ∧ lh-broken
lh-broken
,
: ¬lh-broken ∧ rh-broken
rh-broken
,
which has two extensions T h({lh-broken}) and T h({rh-broken}). Then (lh-broken) =
(rh-broken) = dtc, (lh-broken ∨ rh-broken) = dts and (lh-broken ∧ rh-
broken) = ⊥.
Example 2.3. Let  be the theory:
quaker ∧ republican, quaker : paciﬁst
paciﬁst ,
republican : ¬paciﬁst
¬paciﬁst ,
which has two extensions T h({quaker ∧ republican, paciﬁst}) and T h({quaker ∧
republican, ¬paciﬁst}). Then, (quaker ∧ republican) = t and (paciﬁst) = ∗.
The followings are some properties of .
Proposition 2.2. For formulas F and G, F ≡ G implies (F ) = (G).
Proposition 2.3. For formulas F and G,
(i) (¬F) = ¬(F ).
(ii) (F )k(G) iff (¬F)k(¬G).
(iii) (F ) t(G) iff (¬G) t(¬F).
(iv) ¬((F ) ∨ (G)) = ¬(F ) ∧ ¬(G).
(v) ¬((F ) ∧ (G)) = ¬(F ) ∨ ¬(G).
Proof. The results of (i)–(iii) immediately hold by the deﬁnition of  and the property
of negation in X. De Morgan’s laws (iv) and (v) are also veriﬁed by the deﬁnitions of ∨
and ∧. 
Proposition 2.4. For formulas F and G,
(i) (F ∨G) t(F ) ∨ (G).
(ii) (F ∧G) t(F ) ∧ (G).
(iii) (F → G) t(¬F) ∨ (G).
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Proof. (i) By (F ∨ G) t(F ) and (F ∨ G) t(G), (F ∨ G) t(F ) ∨
(G) holds. (ii)(F ∧G) t(F ) and(F ∧G) t(G) imply(F ∧G) t
(F )∧(G). The result of (iii) follows by the relation (F → G) = (¬F ∨G). 
Example 2.4. In Example 2.2, (lh-broken ∨ rh-broken) t(lh-broken) ∨ (rh-
broken) and (lh-broken ∧ rh-broken) t(lh-broken) ∧ (rh-broken).
As shown above, the degree of truth of (F ∨ G) is generally higher than that of
(F ) ∨ (G). This reﬂects the intuition that a disjunction is more likely to hold even
when each disjunct is not individually included in an extension. By contrast, the degree
of truth of (F ∧ G) is generally lower than that of (F ) ∧ (G). This is because
a conjunction is less likely to hold even when each conjunct is separately included in
an extension. On the other hand, there are no general relations between (F ∨ G) and
(F ) ∨ (G); and (F ∧G) and (F ) ∧ (G) under the k ordering.
2.3. Ordering default theories
Based on multi-valued interpretations, we introduce an order relation between default
theories.
Deﬁnition 2.3. Let 1 and 2 be two default theories which have the same underlying
language. Then, 1 is stronger than 2 (written as 2DL1) if 2(F )k1(F ) for
any formulaF in the language.Wewrite1 DL 2 (called order-equivalent) if1DL2
and 2DL1.
When 2DL1, we also say that 2 is weaker than 1. The relation DL is a pre-
order, i.e., a reﬂexive and transitive relation on the set of all default theories in the language.
Throughout the paper, when we compare different default theories, we assume that they
have the same underlying language and the same Herbrand universe.
Intuitively, a default theory 1 is stronger than another default theory 2 if 1 contains
at least as much information as 2. In other words, when 2DL1, conclusions derived
from 1 are relatively more certain and stable than those derived from 2.
Example 2.5. Let 1 and 2 be two default theories:
1 : bird, penguin, bird : ﬂiesﬂies ,
penguin : ¬ ﬂies
¬ ﬂies ,
2 : bird, penguin, bird : ﬂies ∧ ¬ penguinﬂies ,
penguin : ¬ ﬂies
¬ﬂies ,
where 1 has two extensions: T h({ bird, penguin, ﬂies }) and T h({ bird, penguin,
¬ ﬂies }); and2 has the single extension T h({ bird, penguin, ¬ ﬂies }). Then,1(bird) =
2(bird) = t and 1(penguin) = 2(penguin) = t, while 1(ﬂies) = ∗ and
2(ﬂies) = dfs. So, 1DL2.
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The “stronger” relation reduces to the corresponding relation between (propositional)
ﬁrst-order theories when default theories have no defaults.
Proposition 2.5. Let 1 = (∅,W1) and 2 = (∅,W2) be two default theories. Then,
2DL1 iffW1W2.
Proof. When  = (∅,W), (F ) takes one of the values , t, f, ⊥ for any formula
F. In case of 2(F ) = , 2DL1 implies 1(F ) = . In case of 2(F ) =
t (resp., 2(F ) = f) 2DL1 implies tk1(F ) (resp., fk1(F )). In case of
2(F ) = ⊥, ⊥k1(F ) holds. In each case 2DL1 impliesW1W2. The converse
is straightforward. 
Thus, the relation DL is a natural extension of the “stronger” relation in (propositional)
ﬁrst-order theories. The above proposition also implies that in ﬁrst-order theories the order-
equivalence relation reduces to the logical equivalence.
Corollary 2.6. Let1 = (∅,W1) and2 = (∅,W2) be two default theories.Then,1 DL
2 iffW1 ≡ W2.
On the other hand, when a default theory contains default rules, the order-equivalence
relation is generally stronger than the equivalence based on extensions.
Proposition 2.7. For two default theories 1 = (D1,W1) and 2 = (D2,W2), 1 DL
2 implies EXT (1) = EXT (2). The converse also holds ifW1 ≡ W2.
Proof. When 1 DL 2, 1(F ) = 2(F ) for any formula F. Suppose that 1 has
an extension E which is not an extension of 2. If E = ∅, 1 has the unique extension ∅
and 1(F ) = ⊥ for every formula F. By 1 DL 2, 2 also has the unique extension
E = ∅. This contradicts the assumption. Else if E = ∅, suppose a formula G = ∧F∈E F .
When 2 has no extension that includes G, 1(G) = 2(G). Contradiction. When 2
has an extension E′ that includes G, E ⊆ E′ holds. Then, for any formula F ′ ∈ E′ \E, put
G′ = G ∧ F ′. Since 1 has no extension which includes G′, 1(G′) = 2(G′). Again,
contradiction. Hence, EXT (1) = EXT (2).
To see the converse, letW1 ≡ W2. If EXT (1) = EXT (2) = ∅,1(F ) = 2(F ) =
d for any formula F. Else if EXT (1) = EXT (2) = ∅, 1(F ) = t (resp., f , )
iff 2(F ) = t (resp., f , ) for any formula F. By EXT (1) = EXT (2) and the
deﬁnition of the mapping , it is easy to see that 1(F ) = 2(F ) = x for x ∈{dts,dfs,dtc,dfc, ∗,⊥}. Hence, 1 DL 2. 
Example 2.6. Consider the following three default theories:
1 : bird, bird → ﬂies,
2 : bird, bird : ﬂiesﬂies ,
3 : bird, : bird → ﬂiesbird → ﬂies .
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Then, 2DL1 and 3DL1, while 2 DL 3. Note that all 1, 2 and 3 have
the same extension T h({ bird, ﬂies }).
When two default theories are order-equivalent, it means that they not only have the same
extensions but also share the same sort of information. Thus, the order-equivalence relation
provides an equivalence with ﬁner granularity with regard to the information contents of
default theories.
The order DL is nonmonotonic with respect to the increase of information.
Proposition 2.8. Let1 and2 be two default theories and F a formula. Then,1DL2
implies neither1DL2∪{F } nor1∪{F }DL2∪{F }. In particular,1DL1∪{F }
in general.
Example 2.7. Let 1 and 2 be two default theories:
1 : : p ∧ ¬q
p
,
2 : : p ∧ ¬q
p
, r,
where 1(p) = 2(p) = dts, 1(q) = 2(q) = ⊥, 1(r) = ⊥ and 2(r) = t.
Then, 1DL2 holds. Let F = (r → q). Then, 1DL2 ∪{F } and 1∪{F }DL2 ∪{F } by 1∪{F }(p) = dts and 2∪{F }(p) = ⊥.
The introduction of new information may block the application of some default rules,
which would cause the withdrawal of some default conclusions in a theory. This is a typical
feature of default reasoning.
Example 2.8. Let 1, 2 and 3 be three default theories:
1 : : ¬p
q
,
: ¬q
p
,
2 : p : ¬q¬q ,
q : ¬p
¬p ,
3 : : p ∧ q
p ∧ q ,
: ¬p
¬p ,
where 1(p) = 1(q) = dtc, 2(p) = 2(q) = ⊥, 3(p) = ∗ and 3(q) = dtc.
Then, 1DL3 and 2DL3, while 3DL1 ∪ 2.
The above example shows that 1DL3 and 2DL3 do not generally imply 1 ∪
2DL3. Likewise, 1DL2 and 1DL3 do not generally imply 1DL2 ∪3.
This means that collaborating weaker theories often produce a much stronger theory, and
combining stronger theories does not always produce a much stronger theory. In particular,
1DL2 implies neither 1DL1 ∪ 2 nor 1 ∪ 2DL2.
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We ﬁnally provide a connection between the order relation DL and default
extensions.
Theorem 2.9. Let 1 = (D1,W1) and 2 = (D2,W2) be two default theories. Then,
1DL2 if the following conditions are satisﬁed:
1. W2W1,
2. ∀E2 ∈ EXT (2) ∃E1 ∈ EXT (1) s.t. E1 ⊆ E2,
3. ∀E1 ∈ EXT (1) ∃E2 ∈ EXT (2) s.t. E1 ⊆ E2.
Proof. Let F be any formula. First, suppose EXT (1) = ∅. By the second and third
conditions, EXT (1) = ∅ iff EXT (2) = ∅. In this case, 1(F ) = 2(F ) = d,
thereby 1DL2. Next, suppose EXT (1) = ∅. In case of 1(F ) = , the ﬁrst
condition implies 2(F ) = . In case of 1(F ) = t (resp., f), the ﬁrst condition implies
1(F ) = t (resp., f). In case of 1(F ) = dts, 1(F ) ∈ {, t, f} and F is included in
every extension of 1. By the second condition, F is included in every extension of 2.
Then, dtsk2(F ). Similarly, it is shown that 1(F ) = dfs implies dfsk2(F ).
In case of 1(F ) = dtc, F is included in some (but not every) extension of 1. By the
third condition, F is included in some extension of 2. Then, dtck2(F ). Similarly,
it is shown that 1(F ) = dfc implies dfck2(F ). In case of 1(F ) = ∗, the third
condition implies either 2(F ) = ∗ or 2(F ) = . Thus, ∗k2(F ). In case of
1(F ) = ⊥, it holds that ⊥k2(F ). Hence, in every case 1DL2 holds. 
Theorem 2.9 provides a sufﬁcient condition to see1DL2 using extensions of default
theories. For a necessary condition, we have the following result for a restricted case.
Theorem 2.10. Let 1 = (D1,W1) and 2 = (D2,W2) be two default theories. When
EXT (1) = ∅, 1DL2 impliesW2W1.
Proof. For any formula F, when 1(F ) = , 1DL2 implies 2(F ) = . Else
when1(F ) = t (resp., f),1DL2 implies2(F ) ∈ {, t} (resp.,2(F ) ∈ {, f}).
Thus, in each case W2W1. On the other hand, when 1(F ) ∈ {dts,dfs,dtc,dfc, ∗,⊥},
W1 / F . Hence,W2W1. 
When EXT (1) = ∅, the above implication does not hold in general.
Example 2.9. Let 1 and 2 be two default theories:
1 : p, : ¬q
q
,
2 : ¬p ∧ q.
Then, 1DL2 butW2 / W1.
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3. Ordering nonmonotonic logic programs
3.1. Extended logic programs
In logic programming, default reasoning is realized by negation as failure (NAF). Logic
programs containing NAF are called nonmonotonic logic programs.
Nonmonotonic logic programs considered in this paper are the class of extended logic
programs (ELPs) [12], which contain two kinds of negation; explicit (or classical) negation
¬ and NAF (or default negation) not. An extended logic program (or simply a program) is
a set of rules of the form:
L0 ← L1, . . . , Lm, not Lm+1, . . . , not Ln (nm),
where eachLi (0 in) is a positive/negative literal, i.e.,A or¬Awith an atomA, and not
representsNAF.The literalL0 is thehead and the conjunctionL1, . . . , Lm, not Lm+1, . . . ,
not Ln is the body of the rule. A rule or a program is called not-free if it contains no NAF
(i.e., m = n). Given an ELP , the set of not-free rules from  is denoted by +. A rule
with the empty body L← is identiﬁed with the literal L and called a fact. The head of any
rule is non-empty. 8 A program  containing variables is semantically identiﬁed with its
ground instantiation, i.e., the set of ground rules obtained from by substituting variables
with elements of the Herbrand universe of  in every possible way. We handle ground
programs throughout the paper.
The semantics of ELPs is given by the answer set semantics [12]. Let Lit be the set of all
ground literals in the language of a program (called the literal base). Suppose an ELP and
a set of literals S(⊆ Lit). Then, the reduct S is the program which contains the ground
rule L0 ← L1, . . . , Lm iff there is a rule L0 ← L1, . . . , Lm, not Lm+1, . . . , not Ln in
the ground instantiation of  such that {Lm+1, . . . , Ln } ∩ S = ∅. Given a not-free ELP
, Cn() denotes the smallest set of ground literals which is (i) closed under , i.e., for
every ground rule L0 ← L1, . . . , Lm from the ground instantiation of, {L1, . . . , Lm} ⊆
Cn() implies L0 ∈ Cn(); and (ii) logically closed, i.e., it is either consistent or equal
to Lit. Given an ELP and a set S of literals, S is an answer set of if S = Cn(S).
Answer sets represent possible beliefs of a program, and an ELP may have none, one, or
multiple answer sets. In particular, every not-free ELP has the unique answer setCn().
An answer set is consistent if it is not Lit. If a program has the contradictory answer set Lit,
then this is its only answer set. A program is consistent if it has a consistent answer set. The
set of all answer sets of an ELP is written as AS(). A literal is a credulous conclusion
of a program if it belongs to some (but not all) answer sets of the program; a literal is a
skeptical conclusion of a program if it belongs to all answer sets of the program. 9
Proposition 3.1. An ELP has the unique answer set Lit iff Cn(+) = Lit .
8 Under the answer set semantics which we consider in this paper, a rule with the empty head← F is expressed
by the semantically equivalent rule L← F, not L with a literal L.
9 Again we use the term “credulous” conclusions to denote non-skeptical conclusions.
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Proof.  has the answer set Lit iff Lit has the answer set Lit. As Lit = +, the result
follows. 
According to Gelfond and Lifschitz [12], the rule L0 ← L1, . . . , Lm, not Lm+1, . . . ,
not Ln is interpreted as the default rule:
L1 ∧ · · · ∧ Lm : ¬Lm+1, . . . ,¬Ln
L0
,
where¬¬L = L for a positive literal L. In this case, there is a 1-1 correspondence between
the answer sets of a program and the extensions of the corresponding default theory. 10
Proposition 3.2 (Gelfond and Lifschitz [12, Proposition 3]). Let be an ELP and  its
corresponding default theory. If S is an answer set of , then the deductive closure of S is
an extension of . Conversely, every extension of  is the deductive closure of exactly
one answer set of.
3.2. Ordering ELPs
Using the correspondence between an ELP and a default theory, a multi-valued interpre-
tation for ELPs is deﬁned under the logic X.
Deﬁnition 3.1. Given an ELP, the mapping  associates a literal L ∈ Lit with a truth
value of X as follows:
If AS() = ∅, (L) = d for any literal L; Otherwise,
(L) =


 if L ∈ Cn(+) and ¬L ∈ Cn(+) ;
t if L ∈ Cn(+) and ¬L ∈ Cn(+) ;
f if L ∈ Cn(+) and ¬L ∈ Cn(+) ;
dts if L ∈ Cn(+), ¬L ∈ Cn(+),
and ∀ S ∈ AS() L ∈ S ;
dfs if L ∈ Cn(+), ¬L ∈ Cn(+),
and ∀ S ∈ AS() ¬L ∈ S ;
dtc if ∃ S ∈ AS() s.t. L ∈ S, ∃ T ∈ AS() s.t. L ∈ T ,
and ∀U ∈ AS() ¬L ∈ U ;
dfc if ∃ S ∈ AS() s.t. ¬L ∈ S, ∃ T ∈ AS() s.t. ¬L ∈ T ,
and ∀U ∈ AS() L ∈ U ;
∗ if ∃ S ∈ AS() s.t. L ∈ S, ∃ T ∈ AS() s.t. ¬L ∈ T ,
and ∀U ∈ AS() either L ∈ U or ¬L ∈ U ;
⊥ if ∀S ∈ AS() L ∈ S and ¬L ∈ S.
10 Precisely speaking, not-free rules in an ELP correspond to justiﬁcation-free defaults. Although we supposed
defaults with nonempty justiﬁcations in Section 2, the following discussion is valid apart from the results of the
previous section.
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Note that literals L and ¬L are included in every answer set of  iff they are in Cn(+)
(Proposition 3.1).
The intuitive meaning of  is analogous to that of . Remark that there is a difference
between  and  on the deﬁnition of the values t, f and . This is due to the fact
that not-free rules in Cn(+) are interpreted as justiﬁcation-free defaults in default logic
(Proposition 3.2). Thus, the rule p ← q in+ has a meaning different from the ﬁrst-order
formula p∨¬q inW. Accordingly, there is no correspondence between consequences from
Cn(+) and consequences fromW in a default theory.
With themapping, every program obtains the uniquemeaning evenwhen the program
has no/multiple answer sets.
Example 3.1. Let be the program:
p ← not q,
q ← not p,
r ← not ¬s,
which has two answer sets {p, r} and {q, r}. Then (p) = (q) = dtc, (r) = dts,
and (s) = ⊥.
Example 3.2. Let be the program:
p ← not ¬p,
¬p ← not p,
which has two answer sets {p} and {¬p}. Then, (p) = ∗.
Example 3.3. Let be the program:
p ← not q,
q ← not r,
r ← not p,
which has no answer set. Then, (p) = (q) = (r) = d.
 has the properties obtained from Proposition 2.3 by replacing  with  and
formulas with literals.
An order relation between ELPs is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 3.2. Let1 and2 be twoELPswhichhave the same literal baseLit.Then,1 is
stronger than2 under the answer set semantics (written as2AS1) if2(L)k1
(L) for any literal L ∈ Lit . We write 1 AS 2 (called order-equivalent) if 1AS2
and2AS1.
The relation AS is a pre-order on the set of all ELPs in the language. A program 1
is stronger than 2 if 1 has at least as much information as 2. In contrast to default
logic, we compare programs in terms of literals included in answer sets. This is because
142 C. Sakama / Theoretical Computer Science 338 (2005) 127–152
in nonmonotonic logic programs the meaning of a program is determined by consequent
literals included in selected models of a program.
In what follows, when we compare different programs, we assume that they have the
same literal base. The relation AS has the following properties.
Proposition 3.3. For two not-free ELPs1 and2,1AS2 iff Cn(1) ⊆ Cn(2).
Proof. Not-free ELPs1 and2 have the single answer set Cn(1) and Cn(2), respec-
tively. Then,1(L) and2(L) take one of the values, t, f, ⊥ for any literal L. In case
of1(L) = ,1AS2 iffCn(1) = Cn(2) = Lit . In case of1(L) ∈ { t, f,⊥},
1AS2 iff Cn(1) ⊆ Cn(2). Hence, the result holds. 
Corollary 3.4. For two not-free ELPs1 and2,1 AS 2 iff Cn(1) = Cn(2) iff
AS(1) = AS(2).
Proof. By Proposition 3.3, 1 AS 2 iff Cn(1) = Cn(2). Since Cn(1) (resp.,
Cn(2)) is the answer set of1 (resp.,2), the result holds. 
The order-equivalence relation AS sometimes provides a stronger relation than the
normal equivalence relation based on answer sets.
Proposition 3.5. Let 1 and 2 be two ELPs such that each program has at most one
answer set. Then, 1 AS 2 implies AS(1) = AS(2). The converse also holds if
Cn(+1 ) = Cn(+2 ).
Proof. Let 1 AS 2. Then, 1(L) = 2(L) for any literal L ∈ Lit . Suppose that
1 has no answer set. Then,1 AS 2 impliesAS(1) = AS(2) = ∅. Next, suppose
that1 has the single answer set S and2 has the single answer setT.Assume that there is a
literal L such thatL ∈ S\T orL ∈ T \S.WhenL ∈ S\T ,1(L)kdts but2(L) = ⊥.
This contradicts the assumption 1(L) = 2(L). Similarly, contradiction arises when
L ∈ T \ S. Thus, there is no such literal, thereby S = T . Hence, AS(1) = AS(2).
To see the converse, let Cn(+1 ) = Cn(+2 ). If AS(1) = AS(2) = ∅. 1(L) =
2(L) = d for any literal L ∈ Lit . Else if AS(1) = AS(2) = {S}, 1(L) or
2(L) takes one of the values , t, f , dts, dfs, ⊥ for any literal L ∈ Lit . By Cn(+1 ) =
Cn(+2 ), 1(L) = t (resp., f , ) iff 2(L) = t (resp., f , ) for any L ∈ Lit . Then,
1(L) = 2(L) = x for x ∈ {dts,dfs,⊥}. Hence,1 AS 2 holds. 
1 AS 2 does not imply AS(1) = AS(2) in general.
Example 3.4. Let1 and2 be two programs:
1 : p ← not r,
q ← not r,
r ← not q,
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2 : p ← not q,
q ← not r,
r ← not q,
where AS(1) = {{p, q}, {r}} and AS(2) = {{p, r}, {q}}. On the other hand, all p, q,
and r have the value dtc in both1 and2, thereby1 AS 2.
Thus, the order-equivalence relation between logic programs provides an equivalence
relation which is independent of the normal equivalence relation based on answer sets.
Such incompatibility with the case of default theories will be argued in Section 4.3 in
depth.
The order AS has nonmonotonic properties corresponding to Proposition 2.8 with
respect to the introduction of new rules/literals to a program.
A connection between the order relation AS and answer sets is given as follows.
Theorem 3.6. Let 1 and 2 be two ELPs. Then, 1AS2 if the following conditions
are satisﬁed:
1. Cn(+1 ) ⊆ Cn(+2 ),
2. ∀S ∈ AS(2) ∃T ∈ AS(1) s.t. T ⊆ S,
3. ∀T ∈ AS(1) ∃S ∈ AS(2) s.t. T ⊆ S.
In particular, if AS(1) = ∅,1AS2 implies Cn(+1 ) ⊆ Cn(+2 ).
Proof. Similar to the proofs of Theorems 2.9 and 2.10. 
3.3. Transformational properties
In logic programming, program transformations are used for optimizing a program while
preserving the original meaning of the program. Moreover, any reasonable semantics is
required to be robust under elementary program transformations. In this section we present
the effect of program transformations on the multi-valued semantics of logic programs.
Program transformations considered here are: unfold/fold (UNFOLD/FOLD), elimination
of tautologies (TAUT), positive/negative reduction (RED+/RED−), elimination of nonmin-
imal rules (NONMIN), and elimination of contradictions (CONTRA). These are basic and
representative transformations appearing in the literature [7,26].
For a ground rule r of the form: L0 ← L1, . . . , Lm, not Lm+1, . . . , not Ln, deﬁne
H(r) = {L0}, B+(r) = {L1, . . . , Lm} and B−(r) = {Lm+1, . . . , Ln}. The rule r is then
written as H(r) ← B+(r), not B−(r). Using these notations, the above transformations
are described as follows: Let be a (ground) ELP.
UNFOLD: Replace a ruleH(r)← B+(r), not B−(r) in with rulesH(r)← (B+(r) \
{L}) ∪ B+(ri), not (B−(r) ∪ B−(ri)), whereL ∈ B+(r) andL← B+(ri), not B−(ri)
are all rules in with the head L.
FOLD: Folding is the reverse transformation of unfolding. Replace a ruleH(r)← B+(r),
not B−(r) in  with H(r) ← L, (B+(r) \ B+(r ′)), not (B−(r) \ B−(r ′)) if there is
another rule L ← B+(r ′), not B−(r ′) in  such that B+(r ′) ⊆ B+(r) and B−(r ′) ⊆
B−(r), and L appears in the heads of no other rules in.
144 C. Sakama / Theoretical Computer Science 338 (2005) 127–152
TAUT: Delete a rule r from if H(r) ∩ B+(r) = ∅.
RED+: Replace a rule H(r) ← B+(r), not B−(r) in  with H(r) ← B+(r), not
(B−(r) \ {L}) if L appears in the head of no rule in.
RED−: Delete a rule r from if there is a fact L← in such that L ∈ B−(r).
NONMIN: Delete a rule r from if there is another rule r ′ in such thatH(r) = H(r ′),
B+(r ′) ⊆ B+(r) and B−(r ′) ⊆ B−(r).
CONTRA: Delete a rule r from if B+(r) ∩ B−(r) = ∅.
It is known that the above program transformations all preserve the answer sets of an
ELP [1,7].
Example 3.5. Let be the program:
p ← q, not r,
q ← not s,
q ← p,
s ← .
Applying UNFOLD to the ﬁrst rule, it becomes
p ← not s, not r,
p ← p, not r,
q ← not s,
q ← p,
s ← .
The ﬁrst rule and the third rule are deleted by RED−, and the second rule is eliminated by
TAUT. As a result, the program becomes
q ← p,
s ← .
Given an ELP , let tr() be a program which is obtained from  by applying trans-
formations other than RED+. Then, we have the following results.
Theorem 3.7. Let be an ELP. Then, (L) = tr()(L) for any L ∈ Lit .
Proof. By AS() = AS(tr()), (L) = x iff tr()(L) = x for x ∈ {,d,dtc,
dfc, ∗,⊥}. Since tr() is obtained from  without RED+, Cn(+) = Cn(tr()+),
thereby (L) = y iff tr()(L) = y for y ∈ { t, f }. Then, (L) = z iff tr()(L) = z
for z ∈ {dts,dfs }. Hence, the result holds. 
Corollary 3.8. For twoELPs1 and2,1AS2 iff tr(1)AStr(2). In particular,
1 AS 2 iff tr(1) AS tr(2).
The positive reduction RED+ reduces NAF conditions and does not preserve default
truth values in general.
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Example 3.6. Let  = {p ← not q }. Applying RED+, the program becomes ′ =
{p ←} where (p) = ′(p).
Note that FOLD may also reduce NAF conditions in a rule, but by its deﬁnition folding
does not turn default consequences into deﬁnite ones.
Example 3.7. Let be the program:
p ← not q,
r ← not q.
The ﬁrst rule is folded by the second rule and it becomes
p ← r,
r ← not q.
By the deﬁnition of FOLD, r appears in the head of no other rule in the program, so p is
only derived by the second rule. Consequently, p remains to be default status.
4. Discussion
4.1. Multi-valued default logic
Ginsberg [13] ﬁrstly introduces amulti-valued bilattice for default logic. He distinguishes
between deﬁnite and default conclusions obtained from a (super-normal) default theory
using the bilattice of Fig. 2. However, Ginsberg’s bilattice is seven-valued and does not
distinguish between skeptical and credulous default conclusions. For instance, suppose the
super-normal default theory
 : : p ∧ q
p ∧ q ,
: ¬p
¬p ,
which has two default extensions T h({p∧q}) and T h({¬p}). Then, (p) = ∗, (q) =
dtc, and (¬p∨ q) = dts in our framework, while Ginsberg interprets p as ∗ but handles
bothq and¬p∨q asdt.Thus, to distinguish skeptical/credulous default inference, additional
truth values are necessary as introduced in this paper. In [13], a bilattice having the same
topology as X is used in the context of prioritized default logic, but truth values assigned
to the lattice are different from ours. For super-normal default theories, Brass [6] compares
different default semantics including skeptical/credulous inferences, and investigates their
semantic properties. Dionísio et al. [9] distinguish skeptical/credulous default inference in
super-normal default theories using modal logic. The goal of these studies is to characterize
different types of default reasoning and is not ordering default theories.
From the computational viewpoint, there is a difﬁculty for directly computing  for
an arbitrary formula F. This is due to the fact that the interpretation  of a formula F is
generally not constructive by those of the sub-formulas of F (Proposition 2.4). The same
problem happens in the restricted class of super-normal default theories [13]. For testing
an order between default theories, however, Theorem 2.9 provides a sufﬁcient condition to
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⊥
⊥
∗
df dt
f t
Fig. 2. Ginsberg’s bilattice for default logic.
know the relation1DL2 using default extensions. In the context of logic programming,
1AS2 is examined byTheorem3.6 using the existing procedures for computing answer
sets.
According to Gottlob [14], the complexity of checking the existence of extensions in
propositional default logic is P2 -complete. And the complexity of credulous/skeptical rea-
soning tasks in propositional default logic is P2 /P2 -complete. These results imply that
deciding whether a given formula F has a truth value x ∈ {dtc,dfc, ∗,d,⊥} (resp., x ∈
{dts,dfs}) under the mapping isP2 -complete (resp.,P2 -complete).When EXT () =∅, deciding whether a given propositional formula F has a truth value x ∈ {t, f,} is the
problem of propositional entailment testing in W, which is coNP-complete. On the other
hand, checking the existence of answer sets in a ground ELP is NP-complete, and credu-
lous/skeptical reasoning tasks under the answer set semantics are NP/coNP-complete [17].
This implies that the corresponding decision problems in ground ELPs are one-level lower
than those in default theories. That is, deciding whether a ground literal L has a truth value
x ∈ {dtc,dfc, ∗,d,⊥} (resp., x ∈ {dts,dfs}) under the mapping  is NP-complete
(resp., coNP-complete).WhenAS() = ∅, a ground literal L has a truth value x ∈ {t, f,}
is decided in polynomial time.
4.2. Multi-valued semantics of logic programming
In logic programming, Fitting [11] characterizes the semantics of normal logic programs
using Belnap’s four-valued bilattice [4] (Fig. 3). Normal logic programs do not contain
explicit negation ¬ in a program. The truth value f is then assigned to a ground atom
which is a consequence of negation as failure. On the other hand, the truth value t is
assigned to a ground atom which is either a deﬁnite conclusion of not-free rules or a default
conclusion through negation as failure. Thus, the semantics based on the four-valued logic
does not distinguish between deﬁnite and default information. Bochman [5] provides a
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⊥
⊥
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Fig. 3. Belnap’s four-valued bilattice.
logical formalism called biconsequence relations for nonmonotonic reasoning. His logic
characterizes Belnap’s four-valued inference and semantics of logic programming, but it
is unknown whether it can characterize the ten-valued default semantics. Dix [10] uses
the knowledge ordering under a three-valued logic to compare information obtained from a
single normal logic program under different semantics. This is in contrast to our approach in
which we compare different programs under the single answer set semantics. Lattice-valued
logics are also used for characterizing the “paraconsistent” semantics of logic programs [8].
Multi-valued interpretations introduced in this paper are not paraconsistent, since it is used
for characterizing default logic or the answer set semantics which is not paraconsistent.
However, if we use a paraconsistent version of default logic or logic programming, we
can construct a paraconsistent multi-valued semantics based on the logic X. In case of the
answer set semantics, this is done just by abandoning the logical closedness in its deﬁnition;
we permit an answer set which is not Lit but includes both L and ¬L. To such literals the
truth value  is assigned. For instance, the program {p ←, ¬p ←, q ←} has the
paraconsistent answer set inwhich p has the value and q has the value t. Thus, inconsistent
information is localized and does not trivialize the whole program. An example of such a
paraconsistent answer set semantics for extended logic programs is in [25].
Different types ofmulti-valuedbilattices are introducedby several researchers.Toour best
knowledge, the ten-valued bilattice considered in this paper never appears in the literature.
Moreover, existing studies all use multi-valued logics to provide a semantics of a single
program, while we use them to compare information between different programs.
4.3. Order-equivalence
The order-equivalence provides a stronger relation than the normal extension-based
equivalence (Proposition 2.7). Turner [27] extends the notion of strong equivalence
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relation between logic programs [16] to default theories. Two default theories 1 and 2
are strongly equivalent if for every default theory , 1 ∪  has the same extensions as
2 ∪ . 11 For instance,
1 =
{ : ¬q
p
}
and 2 = {p}
are equivalent in the sense that they have the same extension T h({p}). They are not strongly
equivalent, however, as 1 ∪ {q} and 2 ∪ {q} have different extensions. Comparing the
strong equivalence and the order-equivalence, there is no stronger/weaker relation between
them. For instance,
3 =
{ : ¬q
p
,
q : ¬p
p
}
and 4 =
{
p,
q : ¬p
p
}
are strongly equivalent but not order-equivalent. By contrast,
5 =
{ : ¬q
p
}
and 6 =
{ : ¬r
p
}
are order-equivalent but not strongly equivalent. The strong equivalence captures a context-
independent equivalence, i.e., 3 is replaced by 4 in any default theory without changing
themeaning of thewhole theory.By contrast, the order-equivalence captures a content-based
equivalence, i.e., 5 and 6 bring the same sort of consequences. Thus, two equivalence
relations are different in their objectives and outcomes.
In logic programming, the order-equivalence is not stronger than the normal equivalence
based on answer sets in general. Recall two programs in Example 3.4:
1 : p ← not r, q ← not r, r ← not q,
2 : p ← not q, q ← not r, r ← not q.
1 and 2 are not equivalent as they have different answer sets AS(1) = {{p, q}, {r}}
and AS(2) = {{p, r}, {q}}. Under the interpretation , however, every literal has the
same truth value dtc in1 and2, which makes them order-equivalent. On the other hand,
if we consider the corresponding default theories:
1 : : ¬r
p
,
: ¬r
q
,
: ¬q
r
,
2 : : ¬q
p
,
: ¬r
q
,
: ¬q
r
,
1 and 2 have different extensions EXT (1) = { T h({p, q}), T h({r}) } and EXT (2)
= { T h({p, r}), T h({q}) }. In contrast to the case of logic programs, 1 and 2 are not
order-equivalent. In fact, the formula p ∧ q, for instance, has different values in each
theory: 1(p ∧ q) = dtc and 2(p ∧ q) = ⊥. Such incompatibility comes from the
difference between answer sets and default extensions—the former provides the meaning
of a program as a collection of literals, while the latter provides the meaning of a theory
11 Turner deﬁnes the notion for nested default theories which generalize Reiter’s default theories.
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as a collection of formulas. As illustrated in the above example, two programs are order-
equivalent as individual literals have the same interpretation under . The corresponding
two default theories are not order-equivalent as compound formulas do not necessarily have
the same interpretation under .
4.4. Application to inductive logic programming
In the ﬁelds of machine learning and inductive logic programming, a theory of gener-
alization has been extensively studied in the context of ﬁrst-order logic [19]. However,
generalization under logical entailment  is not directly applicable to default theories and
nonmonotonic logic programs. This is because logical entailment represents a relation over
all models of two theories, while nonmonotonic logics take some selected models into
consideration. To deﬁne a generality relation over nonmonotonic theories, it is necessary
to introduce an order relation apart from logical entailment. A default ordering introduced
in this paper can order default theories and nonmonotonic logic programs, thereby could
give a theoretical ground for inductive generalization in nonmonotonic logic programs. For
instance, consider two programs:
1 : ﬂies(x)← bird(x), not ab(x),
bird(tweety)←,
2 : ﬂies(x)← bird(x),
bird(tweety)←,
where 1(bird(tweety)) = 2(bird(tweety)) = t, 1(ﬂies(tweety)) = dts,
2(ﬂies(tweety)) = t, and 1(ab(tweety)) = 2(ab(tweety)) = ⊥. As a result, the
relation 1AS2 holds. In this place, if we read the order AS as “more general”, 2
is considered a generalization of1. This coincides with the view in the ILP literature [2]
in which 1 is a specialization of 2. In this respect, inductive generalization of a non-
monotonic logic program 1 (under the answer set semantics) is considered a process of
computing a program2 such that1AS2.When1 and2 are Horn logic programs,
it holds that1AS2 iff21 (Proposition 3.3). Thus, generalization based on AS
reduces to the notion of generalization under logical entailment in Horn logic programs.
Now let us look how such generalization based on AS works in induction problems.
First, we set the induction problem as follows: given an initial consistent program (or
background knowledge) 0 and (positive) examples E1, . . . , Ek as ground literals which
are not skeptically entailed in 0, ﬁnd a consistent program 1 which skeptically entails
every example. The program 1 is built by adding (hypothetical) rules to 0. Thus, the
induction problem in nonmonotonic logic programming is captured as computation of a
new consistent program that skeptically entails every example. Note that induction problems
often consider negative exampleswhich should not be entailed, but herewe consider positive
examples only for simplicity reasons. Suppose the initial program as
0 : bird(x)← penguin(x),
bird(tweety)←,
penguin(polly)←,
ostrich(joe)← .
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Given examples
E1 : ﬂies(tweety),
E2 : ¬ﬂies(polly),
suppose the following rules are induced 12
H1 : ﬂies(x)← bird(x), not penguin(x),
¬ﬂies(x)← penguin(x).
The program 1 = 0 ∪ H1 then skeptically entails both E1 and E2. If another example
is incrementally given as
E3 : ¬ﬂies(joe),
the following rules are induced
H2 : ﬂies(x)← bird(x), not ab(x),
¬ﬂies(x)← ab(x),
ab(x)← penguin(x),
ab(x)← ostrich(x),
where the program2 = 0∪H2 entails allE1,E2, andE3. Here, the relations0AS1
and 1AS2 hold, so 0 is generalized to 1 that is generalized to 2. Each example
having the value⊥ in the initial program0 turns into the value dts or t in1 and2 after
induction. Note that this naturally extends induction in Horn logic programs. In induction
from Horn logic programs, given examples have the initial value ⊥ and acquire the value
t after induction. In induction from nonmonotonic logic programs, examples can have the
value dts after induction. This is because induced rules are possibly default rules having
negation as failure in their bodies. In this case, examples implied by those default rules are
in default status.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced multi-valued interpretations of default theories, which
can distinguish between deﬁnite and skeptical/credulous default consequences. Based on
this, we have developed a theory for ordering default theories, that is a natural extension
of the one for (propositional) ﬁrst-order theories. We have then applied the technique to
ordering nonmonotonic logic programs, and shown that the order relation is preserved by
most of the elementary program transformations. The notion of order-equivalence was also
introduced, which is a ﬁne-grained equivalence relation over default theories based on their
information contents.
The results of this paper provide amethod of comparing default theories or nonmonotonic
logic programs in amanner different from the conventional extension-based ormodel-based
12 This paper does not concern with detailed algorithms for induction. Examples of such algorithms are found
in [15,24], for instance.
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standpoint. The ten-valued bilattice introduced in this paper will be used for characterizing
other nonmonotonic formalisms which have the same inference modes as default logic. The
multi-valued semantics of nonmonotonic logic programs is extended to programs containing
disjunctions, and different types of bilattices would be devised under different semantics.
In this paper, we discussed a possible application of the proposed theory to induction from
nonmonotonic logic programs. For another application, it would be used for introducing
priorities over different theories and selecting information frommultiple sources.An exam-
ple is cooperative reasoning in multi-agent systems where an agent has to select information
from conﬂicting agents. In this situation, theory ordering can provide a guideline for select-
ing information based on certainty measure. Further studies on these subjects are topics of
future research.
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